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“Round up the usual suspects!” In the classic film
Casablanca, that was the automatic response by Louie, the
police inspector, whenever a crime was committed. I’ve seen
that movie about a dozen times, and the line always gets a
laugh, even from the most jaded audience. 
I doubt that Thomas Butler would laugh, though. On 3 Sep-
tember, in federal court in Lubbock, Texas, Dr. Butler, a 62-
year old professor of medicine who is chief of the division of
infectious diseases at Texas Tech University, pleaded not
guilty to a 69-count indictment on charges that included
illegal transportation of plague bacteria from Tanzania into
and within the United States; lying to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) by claiming that 30 vials of the bacterial
samples had been stolen when in fact, according to the FBI,
he had destroyed them; embezzlement; tax evasion; and
mail fraud. The case is scheduled to go to trial in November.
Meanwhile, Dr. Butler remains free on $100,000 bail.
Although he cannot, by the terms of his release, visit his lab-
oratory and files at Texas Tech, with the help of a colleague
at Johns Hopkins he managed last week to submit a paper to
The Lancet on the effectiveness of different antibiotics
against the plague. 
There is a Kafkaesque quality to this story, which has so con-
cerned biologists in the US that last week the National
Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Human Rights wrote to
scientists urging them to protest at Dr. Butler’s treatment at
the hands of his own government and urging them to donate
money for his legal bills, which are said to approach half a
million US dollars already. The president of the Academy,
Bruce Alberts, and the president of the affiliated Institute of
Medicine, Harvey Fineberg, wrote a letter to John Ashcroft,
the US Attorney General, on 15 August, stating that the case
against Butler was “troubling” and likely to have a negative
“impact on other scientists who may be discouraged from
embarking on or continuing crucial bioterrorism-related
scientific research.”
My information on the Butler case comes from a variety of
sources, including Eileen Choffnes of the Policy and Global
Affairs Division of the Academy and some excellent pieces by
Scott Shane, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, and Ceci
Connolly of the Washington Post. To begin with, it is important
to realize that Dr. Butler is a recognized authority on infec-
tious diseases, widely respected in that community, and a
particular expert on the plague. His troubles stem from a
series of trips he made in 1994 and 2002 as part of his
research into the most effective treatments for plague, a bac-
terial disease that may have killed as much as a third of
Europe’s total population during the Black Death in the
Middle Ages. On these trips he carried with him a number of
vials containing samples of Yersinia pestis, the plague-
causing bacterium. One of the charges against him is that he
failed to properly report that he was carrying such speci-
mens - even though this method of transport, which is
clearly safer than sending them through the post, is so
common that there is even a nickname for it in the microbio-
logical community: VIP (‘vials in the pocket’). The govern-
ment's outrage seems as disingenuous as Louie's ("I am
shocked - SHOCKED! - to find that gambling has been going
on here," he says to bar owner Rick, just before a croupier
hands him his winnings in another classic scene from
Casablanca). But this incident would never have caught the
attention of the government except for what happened next.
Last January, for reasons that are still unclear and probably
will remain so until Dr. Butler testifies in his own defense at
his trial, he reported to officials at his university that 30 vials
of the bacteria were missing from his laboratory. 
Fearing that the samples may have been stolen by terrorists,
Texas Tech immediately called in the FBI, who in turn noti-
fied the newly-created Department of Homeland Security.
Within days, more than 60 law-enforcement agents had
descended onto the normally sleepy campus in the west
Texas town of Lubbock, a city whose previous claim to fame
was as the birthplace of the legendary rock-and-roller BuddyHolly. Butler, his supporters allege, was taken away in hand-
cuffs and interrogated for ten hours straight through the
night without having an attorney present. What happened
next is unclear, but sources say that, at around 3 am, he
finally signed a statement saying that the plague vials had
been “accidentally destroyed earlier” and that his assertion
that they were missing was “inaccurate”. He claims that he
signed the paper because the FBI agents told him it was nec-
essary to end the investigation. Instead, in April, he was
indicted on 15 felony counts. During the first week of Sep-
tember, these charges were expanded to include mail fraud
and embezzlement in connection with research that he con-
ducted for two pharmaceutical companies. The indictment
states that he received almost a third of a million dollars in
payment from the companies without reporting the income
to his employer, the university. Butler’s supporters allege
that these new charges are an attempt to divert attention
from the weakness of the original charges relating to the
plague samples. They believe that the FBI, the Department
of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security need a
“victory” in the war against terrorism to distract the public
from the failure of their investigation into the anthrax-laced
letters incident, and that Butler is being used as a scapegoat.
Through his attorneys, he denies wrongdoing in connection
with payments from his pharmaceutical company work.
Meanwhile, the whereabouts of some 30 vials of deadly
germs remain unknown: Dr. Butler asserts that the state-
ment he signed under duress was false, and that he has no
memory of actually destroying the vials. 
Without drawing conclusions as to Dr. Butler’s guilt or inno-
cence, one can conclude on the basis of the evidence available
so far that he has acted somewhat peculiarly, and possibly
stupidly. But that doesn’t make him a criminal, and it seems
to me that the government’s prosecution is far out of propor-
tion to any offences he may have actually committed. This
whole affair has the smell of a witch hunt about it, and it’s
pretty easy to guess why. Federal agents and the government
officials who control them need to produce culprits from time
to time to prove that they are doing their jobs. It’s much
easier to prosecute a hapless individual who can be induced
to admit guilt to something than to do the difficult - some-
times, to be fair, impossible - work of finding out what really
happened in a situation where imperfect memory, faulty
record-keeping, and the general sloppiness common to many
scientists make tracing samples a logistical nightmare. 
But I don’t entirely agree with the Academy’s claim that But-
ler’s prosecution - some would say persecution - will neces-
sarily have a chilling effect on research into the genomics,
biochemistry and physiology of pathogenic microbes. Scien-
tists go where the money is, and right now, in the US at least,
there is a lot of money for biodefense-related studies.
Funding trumps fear. What will happen, I think, is that any
scientist with more brains than a gerbil will think twice before
reporting any discrepancy or possible theft of biohazardous
material to either his or her institution or to the government.
Why raise an alarm when the reaction is likely to be to shoot
the messenger, or at least to try to send the messenger to jail
for a long time? The unintended consequence of the Butler
affair is likely to be that it will become more difficult for gov-
ernments to fight bioterrorism, because their natural allies,
their own scientists, will not trust those governments to treat
them as allies. Why chase terrorists who are hard to find
when you can bring to the dock people you already know?
Don’t all witch hunts concentrate, not on outsiders, but on
those close to home? 
Witch hunts make the hunters famous and powerful, at least
for a time, which probably accounts for their recurring popu-
larity throughout history as an instrument of policy. And
witch hunts begin with rounding up the usual suspects. In
the post-genomic world of bioterrorism, it would seem it is
the biologists, not the terrorists, who are most likely to
become the usual suspects. And although one would hope
that governments and scientists would naturally work
together against the misuse of science and technology, the
Butler affair makes one fear that, unlike the case of Louie
and Rick at the end of Casablanca, this will not be the begin-
ning of a beautiful friendship.
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